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NOTES ON THE TERM STRATEGY
A lecture

delivered

by

Professor Edward Mead Earle
at the Naval War College
At!gust 22, 1949

Admiral Beary and Gentlemen of the Naval War College:
I ought to say first of all that I am particularly delighted

to be here. This is my first appearance at the NavalWar College;
That is not due to any lack of appreciation on my part of the Navy
or sea power, but rather to the circumstances which from time to
time have prevented rile from accepting previous invitations. So
that, although this is the first actual appearance, I have a feeling

of warmaffectionforthe College and for the things with which you

are concerned.

.

.

.

I have chosen. this topic of "Notes on the Term Strategy,"

because, as has been said in the introduction, the term is one which

is used in a very great variety of ways, with a great many different
meanings, and not always with great exactitude. The term cannot,

in the nature of things, be defined with great exactitude, and it cer
tainly is not my purpose to give it a definitive and hide-bound
definition this morning. What I prefer to do is to throw out a few

ideas that are suggested by the word and to point particularly to
some of the non-military phases of strategy which have become
increasingly more significant in the last fifty years than they had
theretofore been.

The very word strategy came into use in the English

language only toward the end of' the eighteenth century-some
where after 1763, the end of the Seven Years' War. That in itProfessor Earle is a Professor, School of Economics and Politics;
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University. He is the co'
Military Thought
author and. editor of Makers of Modern Strategy:
.
.
·
from Michiav-elli to Hitler. ·

1

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 10, Art. 2

RESTRICTED
self is significant, I might say, as I'll point out presently. The
word is of Greek derivation coming from the Greek "strategos" or
"strategus". This "Strategus" was first a general officer. He was

an officer of the military forces and in many cases in· Greece he
was also the chief political officer of the government. It was true

in Athens, it was true in the Achean league, that the "Strategus"
was not only commander of forces in the field, but he was also
the Chief Magistrate or whatever other designation the principal
political office of the government happened to be. That idea· was
carried over into the constitution of the United States, in which

the President of the United States was made Commander in Chief
of all the Armed Forces of the United States. In actual practice

in most states, always in time of war, and more frequently than
not in time of peace, the chief political officer of the government
is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. It is usual
in France-not always necessarily true, but usually true-that the

Prime Minister may be the Minister of Defense ; and it frequent
ly has been true in Britain that such is the case as well.
In most of the Utopian literature of the eighteenth century,
which influenced a good deal of the American political thought

which entered into the constitution, the same thing was true
that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces was the same
person as the principal political officer of the government. So that,

even in the very literal meaning of the word "strategy," there is
an implication that it has political as well as military connotations,
associations and implications.

I said that the word did not come into very general use
until the late eighteenth century. And the reason was that it was

not until the eighteenth century that there was much point in dif
ferentiating between tactics and strategy. "Tactics" was the word

in very general use before the word "strategy". But as war be
came somewhat more complicated in its character, for a variety of
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"

;reasons, and finally when war involved the· very existence of a
nation in arms with a revolutionary philosophy, as in the case of

the French Revolution, it was clear that you had tq have a concept
which concerned the handling of all the military resources of the
nation and 'which was not confined merely to what went on in the
actual battlefield.

So long as the very idea of strategy involved

simply a certain number of "ruses de guerre'' and devices for fooling

the enemy as to the disposition of your troops, there wasn't enough
difference between strategy and tactics to necessitate a real differ

entiation in definition. In the first World War, but more particular
ly in the last war, it was true that the Commander in Chief of the

Armed Forces, the principal political agent of the government,

played a conspicuous role in the actual conduct of the war. For ex

ample, I suppose Franklin Roosevelt was more keenly aware of his
job of being Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces than any

other

man

who

ever

occupied

the White House.

Certainly

Winston Churchill, more than any Prime· Minister before him,

felt the keenness of his responsibility for making critical decisions
in connection with the conduct of the war.

The instance of Hitler

is so obvious as to need no comment, and it is significant that

Stalin eventually made himself Generalissimo of the Armed Forces

of the Soviet Union as well as Chief of the Soviet State.

Lincoln

is an instl:\nce of a President who didn't quite know whether he was
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces primarily, or was Presi

dent of the United States primarily, with the result that under

Lincoln we had a good deal of bungling in the conduct of military
operations (a fact with which you are so familiar as to require

no further comment).

As I understand it, the definition in the Navy of the word

"strategy" varies at different echelons of command: that the

strategy to be pursued, we'll say, by the officer commanding a

:fleet of destroyers would be one thing; the strategy of a man in com-

3
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r,nand of a fleet would be another; the strategy of a m,an in com'.'.
mand of all the naval forces in .an area like the Pacific would be

still something else; the strategy of a chief of naval operations
would be on a still different level. And. then on the top of all this
apex is the President of the United States who, after all, has tlle
final say.-

_Not only does the definition of strategy change with the
echelon of command, it changes with time, and with changed cir,.
cumstances. There have been certain changes in the character
and-.. conduct of war for the last two hundred years which, of

necessity, :would have. changed certain of our attitudes toward the
term·''strat�gy" and cert�in of our associations .with the terni. Tlle
criticaLquestion at the moment how,ever, it seems. to me, is wh�ther
strategy is a concept which operates only in wartime or is a ·con
cept which is applicable to times of peace as well. My own feel
ing is very strong that the term strategy must be considered as

operating even when there are no active hostilities.

I do not mean that there is general agreement o� the part of

writers in this field. For example, there is an article in the current

nmnber of

World Politics

by Bernard Brodie, �n . old student .

of

mine, who says it is a mistake to use the term strategy in �on.,.

· nection with peacetime or in connection with politics.

Re prefe�s

the . words "security policy" as a definition of the things that I
would call "grand strategy."

Discussions about semantics are

singularly futile things which l would prefer to avoid. But one

of the reasons why I prefer to use the term, "national strategy'';

or if you like, "grand strategy", even as applied to peacetime, is

that if we use the term, we will be less likely than· we otherwise
would be to overlook the strategic factors in policy, as we have so

often overlooked them in the past. Therefore I would like to keep

the word "strategy" in the forefront of our peacetime thinking,

4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss10/2

4

Earle: Notes on the Term Strategy

RESTRICTED
as well as in the forefront of our wartime thinking, lest we make

critical errors of judgment. We must not overlook one of the
fundamental truths of politics, namely that most political decisions
in the field of international relations have strategical implications
and, vice versa, strategical decisions have their inevitable impact
on politics.

A British historian once said that the British Empire was
built up in a fit of absent-mindedness, a phrase which is very gen
erally quoted and which has an element of truth. But, if you look
over the history of Britain's decisions as to what she would take
as the reward for victory in any given situation, you are impressed
by the very strong influence that the Admiralty had in the making

of ultimate decisions. Usually wars broke out without any thought
that at their termination Britain would end up with another island

in the Mediterranean, or with a position as important, we'll say, as
the Cape of Good Hope. But, when it was being decided at the end
of the war what was to be done in the way of exacting some

penalty from the loser to reward the victor for victory, the Ad
miralty usually stepped in and discovered that there were some
positions of the loser which might be of use to British sea power,
and the civilian agencies of the British government not only heard

the Admiralty but usually accepted their recommendations-not
universally, but usually.
If I had time I could spend a few moments of profit and
amusement on the manner in which Benjamin Franklin frustrated
the Lords of the British Admiralty in connection with what Britain
would take at the end of the Seven Year's war, known in our his

tories as the French and Indian War. The Admiralty wanted to take
the French West Indian Islands and leave France in North America,
and Franklin was determined to get France out of North America
and leave her the West Indian Islands; and Franklin won out in
the ultimate debate.

5
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On the other hand, it has been. rare in American experi
ence for the military forces to have any influence whatsoever in
determining what should be done in matters of this sort. For ex
ample· in 1898, the United States could have had all of the former
Spanish Islands in the Pacific. We chose to take only the Phil

ippines and Guam, leaving the rest of the islands to Spain. They
were thereupon sold by Spain to Germany without any protest on
the part of the United States.

They were seized by Japan in 1914

without any reservation being entered by the United States con
cerning our interests in the matter. They were given to Japan

by the treaties of Versailles in 1918 without effective interposi
tion of the United States, except that they were placed under man
date rather than under Japanese sovereignty-a device which

proved to be a difference rather than real distinction. We had to
win those islands back at tremendous costs, as so many of you
in this room know, in World War Two.

Not only did the armed forces have nothing to say about

such questions, but it is doubtful that at that time they them

selves would have had as broad a grasp of the realities of Pacific
strategy as we had somewhat later.

And it is certain that no

civilian agency in the government gave any thought whatsoever

to the question of the disposition of those islands in relation to

the larger strategic interests of the United States and the
Pacific area.

It is because of that kind of blunder on our part, a blunder

that the British ordinarily did not make before the war of 1914,
which I think would warrant our keeping this word "strategy"
before us as a peacetime concept as well as a wartime concept.
Decisions must be made, if the interests of the United States are

to be properly served, which keep strategical considerations in the
foreground.

6
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So, if you want to call "national strategy," "security policy",

I think you are using a somewhat undramatic term, to put it mildly.

Instead of "national strategy", you are not only using a less des
criptive, a less dramatic term, but you are running a risk that

you will, in the use of that term, depart from one of the things

that is of principal consideration; namely, that political decisions

would be made with constant reference to their strategical im
plications.

Now a moment or two as to the way in which this term

strategy is used in language other than purely military language.

Hitler, for example, continuously used the term "broadened strat

egy," by which he meant a strategy somewhat wider than a purely

military strategy.

And Hitler was a genius at using political in

strumentalities and political formulas. as a means of weakening the
enemy's resistance to the program which he was in the process of

turning out.

A young American journalist wrote a vivid and ex

citing book in 1940 called,

The Strategy of Terror,

in which he said

that the principal weapon in the armory of the Nazies, even before
the shooting started in the War of 1939, was the terrorization of

other peoples so that they would either be afraid to resist, or that

they would resist half-heartedly, feeling that resistance would, in
any case, be futile.

Diplomacy has been called the strategy of peace. And I

have heard General Eisenhower refer frequently in the last few

months to the "strategy of bankruptcy" that the Soviet Union may

be following_;_a, policy of compelling the United States to resist

Soviet pressure at so many points that the burden of responsibility

will be greater than our economy can bear.

So that the word strat

egy in common usage, quite aside from those used in military

textbooks, would suggest that it is no longer purely a milit�ry
thing but is a concept which has non-military phases.

7
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Now, how did this all come about? Well, during the period
up until 1789 or 1793 in Europe, war was a comparatively simple

thing, fought with. relatively small mercenary armies for limited
objectives. With the French Revolution and the war which broke
out between France and the rest of Europe in 1792-1793 you had an
entirely new concept of the Army, and you had the beginnings of the
nation-in-arms, backed, in the case of the French Revolution, with
a tremendous ideological urge. Then the rise of industrialization in

Europe transformed the conduct of war from one which was a
relatively simple operation to one which involved the total resources
of the state, scientific, technological, industrial and the like. The

rise of nationalism required not merely that an Army should be a
conscript Army but also that the Army must know what it was
fighting for, since it would be likely to fight only for objectives

which were national objectives as distinct from the old dynastic
objectives.

. The Europeanization of the world, the spread of European
civilization throughout the world meant too, beginning with 1763

-or even earlier than that-that every war was a world war, and
that decisions concerning the conduct of the war had to be made not

concerning a single front in a limited geographical area, but in a

great variety of fronts in a great many geographical areas, so that

a very changed character and extent of war meant that you had to

have new definitions of strategy to conform to an entirely new

state of affairs.

Now, in a sense, the fundamentals of war haven't changed,

as war in its inception is a political act, not a military act.

The

decision to go to war, or not to go to war, is taken by people

who are essentially civilian in their attitudes, even though they

may be at the given moment officers of the armed forces; or they

may have the dual status that I mentioned of being both civilians
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and commanders in chief. But the decision to go to war is usually
taken by· a· person who is· civilian in attitude and who makes his
decisions for political rather than military considerations. I don't
like to quote the remarks of Clausewitz that "War is the continua
tion of politics by other means-", because it is cited so often that
it seems almost a bromide now. But it is nevertheless really true..
· As he said, war has a different vocabulary, but it has essentially
the same purposes as politics.
Further, the conduct of war in this day and generation is
likewise essentially a civilian matter. For one simple thing, the
civilians determine who shall be in command-which is a matter
of great moment in the conduct of war; And the ability to spot
. able and winning commanders is an ability of great moment to the
state. If you don't think so, just compare our situation in'. this
war with the situation in the Civil War when we had a whole
series of Burnsides, and Popes and "Fighting Joe" Hookers and
the like; where Lincoln seemed, at least in the early days of the
war, to be unable to pick winning commanders for the principal
theater of war.
Even in questions which are supposedly purely military, the
civilians frequently make the critical decisions. There is one
little quotation from Lloyd George's memoirs which I'd like to
read here. The question was before the British in the spring of
1915, as to the number of machine guns that they should provide
for the new army-the new army which had been brought into
being after the declaration of war in August 1914. And Kitchener,
who was the Minister of War in virtual command of the British
Army, suggested that the existing number of two machine guns
per battalion ought to be increased to perhaps four, but that any
thing over four would be a luxury. Of this Lloyd George said,
and this is from his memoirs:
9
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.. "T,ake · Kitchener's maximum, four 'per battalion, square it,
multiply· the result by tw<>; and,. when you are in sight
. of that, double it again for good luck."
· Thus Lloyd George, a civilian minister; multiplied the requis

ition of the · Chief of the· British · Armed · Forces· for machine guns
by sixteen. And by the late suminer of 1915 the British Army was

complaining that it still didn't have enough ·machine guns.

The same thing was true with Lloyd George's putting great

er emphasis on high explosive shells, as compared with ·Shrapnel

shells, very early in the war. So that a great many decisions which
seem to be military, even in their essence, are civilian, even in the
making of decisions in war time.

The more· you see of the con

duet of the First World War the more you realize what a tre;.
mendous role Lloyd George and Churchill played in Britain and

what a tremendous role Rathenau played in · Germany ·in· these
respects.,
.

Of course, you could go on with this sort of. thing, mention-

ing the complicated question of whether ships at sea ·· should be

convoyed in the face of the submarine menace-a decision which
w11,s mad� by Lloyd George, personally;, a decision that they should
be. convoyed.
. .
'

The question
of using tanks
was a decision which
.
. '
'

Chul'Chill
made and which he virtually rammed. do� the throats
.
·.
.
..
. .
pf the British Army against their will. I'm not talking of such

larger que�tions of strategy-such as a war of maneuver to be used

by flank attacks
through
the" ' Dardanelles or Italy versus
a war of'
'
.
. '

attrition-,-because there some of the civilian decisions seem, in

retrospect, to be wrong.· But one could cite ahn:ost as .many
. cases

�here the military decisions were also wrong.

In World War Two the same thing was true-that il' great

many of these critical decisions were made by civilians.

I suppose

one of the decisions which took the greatest courage, the greatest
10
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moral courage, was Churchill's decision to ship out of the British
Isles, in the critical days of 1940, large supplies· of British tanks,
virtually all of their tanks, to North Africa which he had deter
mined to hold and leave Britain itself, then facing invasion, without
tanks. That· decision took courage and balance, . and, in the end,
proved to be the right decision.
The question of how much of the national resources should
be devoted to air power is essentially a civilian decision in Britain
and, in some instances, a civilian decision in the United States. A
question of inter-allied unity of command. was a civilian decision
in. both the first and the second world wars and, . in this . ease,
we avoided the catastrophic results of failing to have unity of com
mand. for a long time. And . the decision to make the European
Theater the principal area of oper�tion was a decision which
Churchill succeeded in persuading both our military and our civil".'
ian authorities to accept again. It was a correct decision. I cite
these as showing that even in military matters civilians have to
make decisions in wartime which seem to be of military character.
War, too, is a social revolution; it does things to the social and
economic structure of a nation. It creates strains and stresses
which can be resolved only by far-reaching revolutionary chang�§l
in society and those changes have to be initiated and carried out by
the civilian authorities as well as suggested, in some instances, by
the military authorities.
As to making peace, the decision as to when peace negotia
tions will be opened and what will be the terms of peace is primarily
a civilian, rather than a military question. Even in time of peace
no political decisions of great moment. in international affairs can
be made without their military implications, and very few strategic
decisions can be made which do not have far reaching political im
plications.
11
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There was a feeling in mo-st professionaJ armed forces before

1914, and there still is...,....and there is reason for it-that politics

is- something. which the· professional officer should not interfere

with. And that's a sound judgment.

But politics is not something

which the professional officer should not be informed about, be

cause failure to be informed about the political results of strategic

decisions may be catastrophic.

I'd like to cite here two German officers of great professional

competence-one was Tirpitz, the builder of the German Navy�

the other was Schlieffen, the Chief of the German General Staff

before the First World War. Schlieffen persistently took the atti

tude that politics was no concern of the regular officer-'-that the de:..

cision should be made on· the merits of the military case without

reference to political repercussions-that politics was the business

of the civilian authorites. Tirpitz took the opposite point of viewthat politics was the· business of the professional officer.

Both

officers helped bring Germany to grief in the First World War.

Whereas, if you should have a somewhat middle of the road line that
it is the business of the professional officer to be

informed

about

political matters and to make strategical decisions in the light of
the political facts of the case-he doesn't need either to intervene

.. in political decisions on the one hand, or to ignore them on the
other as being outside his field of interest or competence.

What

I mean by that is that Schlieffen drew up the famous plan, that

. you all know about, for knocking France out of the war before
Russia could effectively mobilize. He was indifferent to the political
consequences of going through Belgium. That, in his ·mind, was

up to the German government to arrange. One of the catastrophic

errors of the war was the German decision to go through Belgium

even though political accommodations for that act had not been

arrived at... So that, if a brilliant officer ignores political considerations, as Schlieffen persisted in doing, the results may be disastrous.

12
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It is doubtful if Britain could have been brought into the war so
soon if it had not been for the issue of Belgium; and, if she hadn't
been · brought into the war so soon, the results of the war might
have been quite different.
On the other hand, Tirpitz actively interfered in politics
continuously. He understood their military implications, when he
took an active part in effecting political decisions to see that things
went his way. Furthermore, from the very beginning, he con
ceived of the German Navy as having a political, not a naval ob

jective. I could recommend very highly as an entertaining, in
teresting book, Tirpitz's Memoirs. They are very well done and
they give a picture of a type of naval thought that is worth seri
ous study. Tirpitz's view was-at least it may have been preliminary
to a larger view-but he never got the chance to enlarge the or

iginal concephthat the German Navy probably would never be
able to effectively challenge the British high seas fleet; but that,
if Germany had a big enough navy to make it risky for Britain to
fight Germany at all, the Navy would have the effect of keeping
Britain out of the war-the war which most German staff offi
cers presumed would come in Western Europe. So the German
navy was built on the idea that it would be a continuous threat
to the British fleet in the British home waters. That was a political
goal for the Navy, rather than essentially a naval goal. That is an
interpretation, if you like, but I think it is essentially a sound

interpretation. The German navy could have built a navy primarily

for waging a war against British commerce, and it could have put

still heavier emphasis on the submarine before the outbreak of the

war in 1914.

The German High Seas Fleet was designed as a

means of keeping Britain out of the war.

And Tirpitz miscalcu

lated, because he didn't understand two things; first, that it was

possible for the British to make all sorts of accommodations with

other powers so as to strengthen their fleet in home waters; and,

13
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second, that the one thing that Britain would not tolerate froni

any power on the continent of Europe was a real threat to the se

curity of the British Isles such as the German fleet implied, and as
Tirpitz intended it to imply.

I mention these two very gifted German professional officers

as illustrations of the danger of being uninformed about politics

and of the danger of either jgnoring them, as Schieffen was in

clined to do, or of attempting to influence political decisions, as

Tirpitz continuously tried to do.

There is a rather nice little story of Tirpitz's interfering in

political· decisions in a more direct way.

In 1912 to '13, when the

British were trying to come to a naval understanding with the Ger

mans on the basis of limiting the construction of capital ships,

Churchill went to see the German naval attache, at least met him in

formally, and said, "Now we really mean business about this; we
really want to cut down the building programs of both nations;
we want to come to an accommodation with Germany."

And the

German naval attache wrote a private letter to Tirpitz and said,

"What do I do with this information?" Tirpitz wrote back and

said, "You tell the German Ambassador that you have had a con

versation with Churchill and that your impression is that Churchill
was not very sincere about these naval negotiations."

That's how

far Tirpitz was willing to go. in influencing political· decisions.

But,

as I say, I'm not sure that this story is in his memoirs. We have

all of Tirpitz's papers, incidentally, in the National Archives in

Washington, and any of you who read German could have some
fun spending some time reading Tirpitz's papers, to advantage.

Now I have taken a shot at a definition of strategy which you

can find in

Makers of Modern Strategy.

I'm just going to take

time to read this and make comment on it, if I may.

"Strategy deals with war, preparation of war, and the
waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of military

14
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command, of projecting and directing a campaign. The
Oxford dictionary defines it in a sense as the art of the
Commander in Chief. It is different from tactics which is
the art of handling forces in battle in much the same
way as an orchestra is different from its individual
instruments.
Until about the end of the 18th century, strategy con
sisted of a body of strategems and tricks of war, "ruses
de guerre", by which a general sought to deceive the
enemy. But as war and society have become more com
plicated-and war is an inherent part of society-strategy
has of necessity required increasing co�sideration of the
non-military factors: economic, psychological, moral, pol
itical and technological.
Strategy therefore is not merely a concept of wartime
but inherent element of statecraft at all times. Only the
most restricted terminology would now define strategy as
the art of military command."
In preparing this book Makers of Modern Strategy, we
brought · all sorts of people into the picture who wouldn't fit into
the category of military commanders. You know we use Marx and
Engels as fathers of the strategy w�ich to some extent the Soviet
Union has followed, the strategy of subversion, of subverting the
political integrity and the moral conviction in other states in the
justice of their cause. We took Alexander Hamilton and Rath
enau as the fathers of a nation with great industrial potential for
war. It was the conscious objective of Hamilton and Rathenau to
make the United States and Germany, respectively, nations of
great war potentials as they were certain to become by becoming
great industrial nations.
One can, if you like, accept the Brodie point of view
that these matters should be properly called "security policy"
rather than "strategy." As I say, that to some extent is a mat-

15
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ter of semantics but basically, to me, the important thing is to keep
continuously, by the use of the term strategy, national strategy or
grand strategy in the mind of the politician the idea that strategical

factors must be taken into consideration in making political de
cisions, and to keep continuously in the mind of the professional of
ficer the necessity of being informed upon politics, national and in
ternational, even though he may not take and perhaps should not
take an active part in influencing political decisions.
To go back to Tirpitz and Schieffen again, the Chief of the
German General Staff was of course the great figure in Germany.
The Navy in its early days was small potatoes in the national scheme
of things. As the Chief of the German General Staff, SchUeffen,
if he had been more alert than he was politically, might have seen
the political consequences of the vast German naval building pro
gram; and even as a soldier, had he been more alert, he would have
seen that from the point of view of Germany the building of a
fleet of this kind was a diversion of the resources of the nation
away from the basic plan. The Schlieffen Plan came within a hair's

breath of succeeding in 1914. If all of the resources that had gone
into the German navy from 1898 to 1914 had been available to the
right wing of the German army in those critical days of August
1914, the battle of the Marne might never have been fought,
Paris might have been captured and the war won by Germany
by a fairly safe margin. So that one can't overlook, in making

plans, the inter-relations of the Services to one another. I'm not
suggesting by this that all navies belong in that category. It's just
that in the nature of things the Germans could never hope to obtain
a navy of decisive character-a high seas fleet which could de
cide the outcome of the war. Their mere possession of a fleet
capable of challenging the British decided the outcome of the war
against them, which was one of the great German ,catastrophies.

The more I read of history the more I am convinced that
16
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history is sometimes - governed by coincidence. One of the - most

fateful coincidences in history is the fact that the United States
and Germany both became great powers at the same time.

Had

the United States become a great power fifty years later than she

did, Germany might well have won the First World War. In fact, I

think she would have won the First World War.

Had the United

States not been a great power in 1940, Germany would almost cer

tainly have won the Second World War.

And what is it in history

that accounted for this pure coincidence? The U�ited. Stat�s might

have become a world power fi:fty years later. Then you get back into
so many causes as to why_ so many people wanted to get out of

Europe and come· to the United States and thus build · up the

population and the resources . of this virgin continent.

Cohici

dence frequently plays a g:reat role, and coincidence of the Ger

man navalchallenge p:roved to be a challenge to the United States,
as

well as to Britain,

in the years 1914 to 1917. It was a matter

which very few Germans could have foreseen and which virtually

no American foresaw. Admiral Sims had a pretty clear picture of

the situation, but he was virtually alone in that· respect for a con
siderable period of time.

Now no ·nation, of course, can afford to make an over-all

foreign policy without reference to considerations
of national se.

- '

curity; that is, after all, fundamental. You take the history of

French policy over three hundred years; and the m:ore it changes,

_the more it remains the same thing, until the unhappy days be

tween the two ·world wars when the French didn't seem to be able

to make any effecfive decisions. And pretty much the · same thing

was true of Britain. But the French had running through their

history-three clear cut objectives; _one was to keep· Germany dis

united, because a disunited Germany was not a serious threat tp the

integrity of France; the second, was . to have allies in Eastern

Europe and Southern Europe so that, in the event France did have

17
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to .fight Germany, Germany would have to fight a wa.r on two fronts;
and a third objective was to have frontiers which were relatively
easily defendable because they were natural frontiers-mountains
and rivers and the like-or failing "natural frontiers" to have
fortified frontiers. And it was only when the French got away from
those basic factors, which ruled for three hundred years, that they
were finally and irrevocably defeated by the Germans in 1940.
The British have had a similar long-term security policy. At
the heart of that policy was the determination, over a period of
three hundred years, not to allow any naval power to rise which
would threaten the security of Britain's home waters. And
corollary to that was the idea that no powers must control the low
countries, which are across the narrow body of water, across the
straits, from Britain itself; and, finally, that no power must domi
nate the whole continent of Europe, because any power controlling
the whole continent of Europe would be in a position to build an ef
fective sea power paramount to that of Britain. And I could go on
with the United States and the Soviet Union as to these controlling
factors, as to these security factors, in making a foreign policy.
Those are things that no statesman may ignore except at the
national peril. At the same time, in individual cases, wrong de
cisions may be made because of failure to take account of the
strategical factor, as I cited in the case of the· Pacific Islands. So
that the wise statesman will keep continuously in the forefront,
rather than in the background of his thinking, the idea that strategy
is a concept of politics as well as a concept of war.
There is just one closing thought I'd like to throw out,
and that is, that it is important for the professional officer to be
informed on politics-the more broadly the better. Not merely so
that he can help to make the correct strategical decisions, but be
cause, at times, he has to make decisions which are political or
18
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quasi-political in character. There are always·some questions which
the civilian agencies of the government will not answer. In other
words, you can't draw a war plan without certain presumptions as
to who the enemy is going to be. It seems easy to do that now
because you know who is right over the horizon. We know that

now, but you remember the case of Woodrow Wilson.seriously sug
gesting that the Chief of Staff be fired in 1916 because he had draft
�d a plan for American campaigns against Germany in the event
we became involved iri the European war. Wilson had the theory

that merely drawing up a plan as to what you'd do if you got into
war with Germany would prejudice the good relations between the
United States and Germany, which at that time, even in the midst
of war, in which we clearly were going to be involved, he wished to
maintain on a cordial level.

Questions like, who is the enemy going to be? How near or
how remote is the possibility of hostilities? These are questions
which again civilian agencies of the government are always re
luctant to answer. Now I'm well aware that dealing with questions
of that kind on a military level is playing with dynamite, but it
is also playing with dynamite not to deal with them. And so you
have the real fact that you do have to deal with them. And you
have the fact that it is dangerous to deal with them. And part of
the art of being a soldier, or an airman, or a great commander of
naval forces is to deal� not with easy questions which anybody
could answer, but with the difficult questions.
I'd like to read one other thing; I'm going to leave this be
hind me. This is a brief statement taken from a lecture I gave in
Denver a year or so ago on "What is National Power?" and this
paragraph has been said by various· people to be worth quoting.

"National power in the present day world is a complex
and diverse phenomena. It is no longer the 'walled towns,
stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horses,
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· chariots of war; elephants, ordnance artillery' and the like
to which Francis Bacon referred more than three centuries
ago.. Neither is gold the major source of nationa}might, as
was thought by the mercantilists of the 18th century.
Power is now, as it conventionally has been, men and ships
and guns. It is planes, rockets, bombs. It is landing craft,
flame throwers, machine guns. It is radar devices and fire
control mechanisms. But even more,. it is factories and
farms, assembly lines and tractors, skilled labor and tech
nicia:qs, labor.atories anq. the scientists who work in them.
It is the ribbons of steel called railroads and the ribbons of
concrete called. supe,r highways. It is the pronouncements
t
of statesmen aild the teachings of seers. I is tefophone
wire and radio communications. It is atomic weapons and
the means of.their manufacture. It is all the·multifariolis
forms in which modern industry, modern agriculture:, mod
ern communications and modern finance manifest them
selves. It is also education, the press, the church, the spirit
of. our youth. There is no . phase of American life which
does not contribute to our national power. Conversely, we ..
could not sacrifice any appreciable portion of our power
without curtailing some vital activity and impairing some
essential quality of the American people.
In other words, we cannot escape the role of Great
Power which History and Destiny have thrust upon us. A .
rich man may forsake the world and give all his goods to
the poor. But the wisdom of man and the art of the poli
tician know not how a Great Power can divert itself of
those things which can make it a Great Power. Power
then is fundamentally a matter of fact, not volition. We
may use our· power, or misuse our power. But we. cannot
discard our power or conjure it away."
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